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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
Many countries prevent domestic broadcasters from freely choosing the proportions of 
international and ‘domestic’ content that they broadcast.  Why is this done?  Mas-Colell 
(1999) draws a useful distinction between “protection of national cultural production” and 
“protection of the production of national culture.”  The former is protection designed to 
maintain the existence of a particular industry, be it sound recording or movie-making and, as 
Mas-Collel suggests, it is difficult to see why the case for such protection is much different to 
the case for preserving shoe-making, car assembly or any other sector of the economy.  The 
second term, however, refers to policies designed to, “promote the availability and 
consumption of [cultural goods] transmitting “Spanish”, “French” or “Catalan” content: 
language, historical episodes, costumes, traditions, and the like.”  While the former is 
certainly cited by proponents of cultural protection, their principal arguments are of this latter 
sort: that cultural industries
1
 should be protected to save unique aspects of the local culture 
and identity and to foster global cultural ‘diversity’.2  
  The primary way in which broadcasting quotas might be used to achieve these goals 
is that being exposed to domestic music on the radio leads consumers to buy more such 
recordings.  But a local content requirement constrains radio stations from choosing the 
airplay mix they prefer and so might impact on welfare through distorting this mix.  
Furthermore, the requirement may not bind on all genres.  It will be particularly relevant 
where there is a greater preference for international content and one might anticipate that it 
                                                 
1
 The scope of industries that might be considered ‘cultural’ is vast, including food industries, protected under 
geographical indications legislation as well as more directly.  Gordon and Meunier (2001) (p.30) cite the 
following position of one French commentator: “McDonald’s … commercial hegemony threatens our 
agriculture and its cultural hegemony insidiously ruins alimentary behaviour – both sacred reflections of the 
French identity.” 
2
  This is by no means an uncontroversial proposition.  It finds an extravagant expression in the words of  ex-
French President Mitterand, cited at p.1147 of Acheson and Maule (2006): “Creations of the spirit are not just 
commodities…What is at stake is the cultural identity of all our nations…  A society which abandons to others 
the way of showing itself, that is to say the way of presenting itself to itself, is a society enslaved.”  By contrast, 
Revel (2003) perceives the French position as being essentially one of anti-Americanism and writes, “[t]he idea 
that a culture can preserve its originality by barricading itself against foreign influences is an old illusion that 
has always produced the opposite of the desired result. Isolation breeds sterility.”  
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will induce a shift in airplay away from international providers of those genres towards 
domestic artists in the same genre.  Finally, a positive link between airtime and recording 
sales means a binding quota will induce entry by content providers into these constrained 
genres.  Thus a local content quota might lead to the increased ‘internationalization’ of 
domestic music: Celine Dion, Shania Twain, Avril Lavigne and other Canadian singers might 
be considered essentially indistinguishable from U.S. artists.
3
     
To model this policy instrument fully requires a setting in which listening to radio 
airplay affects record purchasing decisions and in which both the entry decisions of artists 
and the contracting decisions of record companies are considered.  There is an extensive 
literature on the economic analysis of broadcasting, discussed more fully in Richardson and 
Wilkie (2013), but few authors address the issues focused upon here.  In particular, we are 
not aware of any literature that formally models the artist/record company/radio 
station/consumer interaction.  This paper analyses the consequences of a local content 
requirement in radio broadcasting when entry decisions of artists are endogenous.  To do so, 
it constructs a model of the market for recorded music, integrating consumers (as both radio 
listeners and purchasers of recordings), radio stations, record companies and content 
providers (‘bands’).  In any genre there is an endogenous set of new domestic bands that 
could be contracted by a record company and some (endogenous) subset is, in fact, so 
contracted.  Record companies extract record sales revenues and rents (from activities like 
concerts) from contracted bands for up to two periods; surviving bands then go off-contract 
and retain such income themselves.  Genre-specific radio stations choose the airplay mix 
                                                 
3
  Hence our titular reference.  Our first encounter with the term ‘Canadian divas’ was in an online opinion piece 
of Paul Krugman’s suggesting that, “Boston residents who indulge their taste for Canadian divas do undermine 
the prospects of local singer-songwriters and might be collectively better off if local radio stations had some 
kind of cultural content rule”  Krugman (1999).  He goes on to note that, “there is a very fine line between such 
arguments for collective action and supercilious paternalism, especially when cultural matters are concerned”.   
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between new and established bands to maximize the listening time of their audience (in order 
to sell advertising time
4
) and consumers only buy the recordings of bands aired on the radio. 
We then consider the imposition of a local content quota in broadcasting – one that just 
specifies an upper limit on the share of airtime devoted to international music – in this setting 
and derive its steady state effects on entry decisions and, importantly, welfare.  Such quotas 
are typically justified on the grounds of thwarting the ‘internationalization’ of music, but we 
show that they can have exactly the opposite effect by inducing a shift in the pattern of band 
entry into ‘international’ genres.  Nevertheless, we show that a mild quota5 will be welfare-
improving in this model, for (inter alia) a novel reason: it raises the profitability of successful 
domestic bands and thus encourages entry by new domestic entrants, the increased diversity 
of which appeals to some consumers.  In practice, some countries have refined their quotas to 
remedy a perceived problem with the simple quota: the latter can be (and is, in our model) 
met by just increasing the airplay of established domestic bands and thus appears to do little 
for new talent.
6
  We discuss the consequences of such a modification and show that, while the 
addition of a ‘new’ band component decreases the total amount of radio listening time by 
consumers (yielding a welfare loss), it does nothing to incentives to sign up new bands. 
A number of economists have looked at radio broadcasting (e.g. Coase (1966), Berry 
and Waldfogel (1999a, Berry and Waldfogel (1999b), Anderson and Coate (2005) and 
Rogers and Woodbury (1996)).  There is a long literature addressing the question of optimal 
program diversity and its relationship to market structure (see, for example, Doyle (1998) and 
Richardson (2006)) but in the context of models in which a broadcaster chooses its 
                                                 
4
 Mangani (2003) considers a model of broadcasting in which programs differ along both a vertical and a 
horizontal dimension and in which profit maximisation and audience maximisation are different things.  This is 
not the case here. 
5
  We use ‘mild’ to describe a quota that is just binding in a genre.  
6
  France and Australia, for example, require that a specified fraction of the local content quota must be met by 
the playing of ‘recent’ recordings.  “French music radio stations must broadcast a minimum of 40% French 
music (50% of which must be dedicated to "new" French artists).” American University ICT Database 
(2001).  For more on the prevalence of local content requirements in broadcasting see the Appendix to this 
paper, available on request. 
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programming mix from some spectrum.  There is a substantial policy-oriented literature 
discussing cultural quotas and related issues at an informal level (see, by way of example, 
Acheson and Maule (1990) and Jacobsen (2000)) but only a few recent papers (such as 
Francois and van Ypersele (2002) and Bala and Long (2005)) construct formal models of 
cultural protection.  These are ‘big picture’ models of cultural goods, considering whether 
there might be something distinctive about the production (Francois and van Ypersele) or the 
consumption (both papers) of such goods that gives rise to novel arguments for protection.  
Our paper focuses more specifically on a particular sector and a particular policy instrument.  
Some papers have looked explicitly at broadcasting quotas (Crampes and Hollander 
(1999), Owen and Wildman (1992) and Richardson (2006)) but none share our focus.  Perona 
(2010) articulates explicitly the suggestion made above that a simple quota can be met just by 
putting established domestic artists on higher rotation but his model focuses on the decisions 
of radio stations regarding which set of genres to broadcast.  Our scope is rather different, 
looking at the decisions of suppliers of content – bands and recording companies – as well as 
the broadcasting choices of radio stations.  His “loss of diversity” result is from the 
broadcasting of fewer genres; ours is from the pattern of induced entry into genres.     
Section 2 of the paper lays out our model, section 3 explains the timing of actions and 
section 4 exposits the laissez-faire, no-quota equilibrium of the model.  Section 5 analyses the 
impacts of local content quotas, a further section considers the robustness of the analysis and 
a final section concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
We consider a model with four sets of actors: bands, record companies, radio stations and 
consumers.  The model is effectively an overlapping three-period model.  We consider each 
set of actors in turn. 
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i. Bands 
We make a small country assumption: there is a fixed number of foreign bands all of which 
are, by definition, ‘successful’ and may be either on- or off-contract with foreign record 
companies – all revenues and rents earned by foreign bands accrue offshore.  There is a large 
number of potential new domestic bands indexed by j =1,2,… that might enter into genre g; 
an endogenous subset Mg actually does so.   
New bands incur a fixed cost FB to enter a genre gG={1,2,…,G} and may be 
approached by record companies and contracted.  In their 1
st
 period bands make record sales 
that depend positively on their radio airtime but earn nothing from this, as they are under 
contract to a record company.  In any genre, some new entrants will fail and exit while others 
will succeed and survive into the next period.  Successful bands not only sell records but 
generate a rent each period, representing surplus from concert revenues, T-shirt sales and so 
forth.  In a band’s first period of success this, too, accrues to the record company.  There is 
some probability 1-h of exit for a band after one period of success (under contract) so with 
probability h a successful band in its 2
nd
 period goes on to become a successful band in its 3
rd
 
(and final) period, when any rents accrue to the now “off contract”7 band.  So in any genre g 
there will be ng* successful foreign bands, ng2 (ng3) successful domestic bands on (off) 
contract and ng1 new domestic entrants, for a total of Ng≡Ngs+ng1≡ (ng*+ng2+ng3)+ng1 bands. 
ii. Record Companies 
We focus only on domestic record companies (or autonomous domestic affiliates of 
international companies.)
8
  Each of an exogenous number of record companies incurs a fixed 
cost in period one, F1, for managing a new band (which covers recording and promotion 
                                                 
7
  By “off-contract” we simply mean that bands themselves capture a larger share of the surplus they generate, 
normalised to one for convenience.  Successful bands still remain with record companies in practice and this 
simplification is intended just to capture the idea that the financial rewards to bands are postponed until after 
they are demonstrated successes. 
8
  In practice the surplus generated by foreign artists will be a factor in determining record company attitudes 
towards broadcasting quotas, but here we focus solely on their positions vis-à-vis their domestic artists.   
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expenditures) and a fixed cost in period two, F2, for managing a successful band that is still 
on contract.  Each record company specializes in a particular genre (so our record companies 
can alternatively be thought of as independent units within record companies): there is a one-
to-one mapping between the set of record companies and the set of genres.
9
     
A record company will consider the set of new entrant bands in its genre (Mg), choose 
a number of them to sign up (ng1) and offer them a contract that involves a payment to the 
band in return for the record company being entitled to all revenues from the band for its first 
two periods: record sales less F1 in the band’s first period and the band’s second period 
record sales and rents (if successful) less F2.  Because bands commit to a genre before a 
contract is signed and because each genre has a single record company in it, so all surplus 
from the relationship can be extracted by the record company.  We assume bands have an 
outside option valued at zero; hence the equilibrium contract offer to a band is zero.
10
  
Nevertheless, every new band costs the record company F1 to record and promote and it will 
seek to make money particularly on those bands that subsequently succeed.  A record 
company then records its new artists and presents and promotes these bands to radio stations.   
iii. Radio Stations 
As our focus in this analysis is on the responsiveness of producers – bands and record 
companies – to cultural quotas, we do not model the decision-making of radio stations 
completely.  Each of Kg (endogenous) radio stations incurs an entry cost Fs and specializes in 
genre g.  Each station's effective objective is to maximize the time its listeners devote to 
listening to it – enabling it to sell more (unmodeled) advertising – and this entails maximizing 
the welfare of its audience, insofar as it can.  The station has a fixed endowment of airtime, 
                                                 
9
 This is a significant assumption needed to make the model tractable and its impact is discussed in s6i of the 
paper. 
10
  One might consider that a band could be offered less than this: it could self-fund some of Ft either directly or 
through borrowing.  But the unobservability of a band’s quality makes the latter infeasible (in the case where 
bands differ in quality) and, if bands have zero assets, the former is also infeasible.  We take the 2-period 
contract as exogenous to capture an observed feature of reality.   
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normalized to one, to allocate to bands and we assume it faces a two-stage problem in this 
decision: first it chooses the allocation of airtime between successful, established bands and 
new entrants and then it decides how much of each of these allocations to devote to each 
relevant band.  We assume that each station receives α in advertising revenue per unit of 
listener time it attracts to its programming.
11
   
iv. Consumers 
Two types of consumer derive utility from a particular genre
12
 of music from two sources: 
listening to it on the radio and buying a recording.  Each of the L consumers, normalized to 
one henceforth, has lexicographic preferences over the genres so that they are divided across 
the genres that are aired and a fraction λg listen to genre g (so ∑gλg=1.)  All consumers 
consider new music and established music to be differentiated generically, insofar as 
purchasing recordings is concerned.  Within genre g some consumers – an exogenous fraction 
μg – are ‘enthusiasts’ or ‘purists’: they value diversity within their preferred genre and derive 
utility both from hearing music on the radio and from purchasing the recordings of their 
favorite new artist.  The remaining fraction 1-μg of a genre's consumers are ‘faddists’: they 
derive utility from being part of the latest trend and buying the recordings only of successful 
artists, domestic and foreign.  Both kinds of consumers’ problems boil down to which 
recording to buy and how much time to devote to radio listening. 
 We assume that all consumers in any genre are equally split across the (identical) 
radio stations in the genre and, purely for reasons of tractability, have identical Cobb-Douglas 
preferences with respect to radio listening – as opposed to recording purchases, where 
faddists and enthusiasts differ – defined over the mix of airtime devoted to new entrant bands 
                                                 
11
  So a radio station broadcasts throughout the day – one unit of time – and splits that between new and 
established bands.  A consumer listens to the radio for some period of time and it is assumed implicitly that that 
is randomised across the day so that a consumer will hear new and established bands in the same ratio in which 
they are played by the radio station. 
12
  Berry and Waldfogel (1999b) note that there is a positive and significant relationship between the number of 
different formats offered in radio broadcasting – our genres – and the share of the population that actually listens 
to the radio, suggesting that consumers do, indeed, have genre preferences.   
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in the genre and to established, successful artists.  In particular, the utility derived by a 
consumer in genre g from listening to the radio depends on Ag (the airtime devoted in genre g 
to new bands), Ags (the airtime devoted to successful, established bands, whether domestic or 
foreign), tg (the consumer’s choice of time to devote to radio listening) and w (the consumer’s 
opportunity cost of time spent listening to the radio), all in the fashion expressed in (3) below.   
But the consumer also chooses to purchase the recordings of their favorite band and 
derives additional utility from that.  We model this as a discrete choice in the following way: 
a consumer places a value vgj on purchasing the recording of band j in genre g and this value 
depends on the band's share of radio airtime, agj, the (common) price of the recording p
13
, and 
a random idiosyncratic component εgj.  Thus vgj= agj + εgj – p and we assume the idiosyncratic 
values are independently and identically distributed according to the double-exponential 
distribution function: 
  ( )     {    } 
(1) 
We can then calculate the probability, denoted xgj, that a particular new band j yields the 
maximum utility across all new bands in the genre for an enthusiast consumer: 
     
   {   }
∑    {   }
   
   
 
(2) 
Note from this that, if all bands had the same airtime, each would be equally likely to be a 
consumer’s favorite band (with probability 1/ng1.)   
The expression for xgj indicates a consumer’s likelihood of purchasing the recording 
of band j in genre g.  But consumers also derive utility from hearing music on the radio, as 
discussed, so the problem facing the consumer who buys the recording of artist j is to choose 
tg to maximize their total consumer utility given by:  
                                                 
13
  We do not model the setting of uniform prices in this sector, but take it as a long-standing feature of the 
industry (if puzzling to economists: see Shiller and Waldfogel (2011).  However, see Richardson and Stähler 
(2013) for one possible asymmetric information based explanation.)   
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      (  )(  
 
   
   
)  (    )      (3) 
For radio stations, the only choice variable is the airtime devoted to each band and we 
assume that they give each new (established) band an equal share of the total airtime the 
station itself chooses to devote to new (established) bands.  So the radio station’s choice – 
sans quota – is how much of its airtime to devote to new music and how much to devote to 
established music; within each of these allotments it simply divides up the time available 
equally across all relevant bands.
14
   
Figure One presents a summary of these relationships within a genre. 
 
 
                                                 
14
  If consumers have any preference for diversity within the A and As allocations (so would prefer to hear each 
of 20 songs once rather than hear the same song 20 times), as in Perona (2010), then it would be optimal for the 
radio stations to behave as supposed here.  We do not explicitly model this, however: the actual sub-allocation 
here is strictly a matter of indifference to radio stations. 
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3. Timing 
We assume that before each period t the government imposes any domestic music quota; all 
potential new bands then choose their genre; they present to the genre-specific record 
company and are either contracted or not; contracted bands are recorded and presented by the 
record companies, along with established, successful bands, both domestic and international, 
to radio stations who choose how to allocate airtime to these recordings; consumers devote 
time to listening to a radio station, given these allocations, and purchase recordings of either 
new or established artists.  Then some bands ‘succeed’ and become established, earning rents 
for periods t+1 and (with survival probability h) t+2 before disappearing, while unsuccessful 
new bands from t fail and disappear before t+1.  We consider only steady-state equilibria. 
 
4. No quota 
i. Agents’ choices 
Consider first the decisions of radio stations.  A genre-specific station in g knows that a 
fraction μg of its gL/Kg consumers choose tg to maximize (3) and the rest choose tgF to 
maximize an analogous expression and so choose their listening times so that: 
 
  
 
   
   
     
  
 
   
   
      
(4) 
To maximize tg and tgF, the times consumers spend listening to the radio, the station should 
thus choose its mix to maximize the LHS of each equation in (4), subject to the constraint that 
the overall airtime shares sum to one. So, in equilibrium, tg=tgF. 
 The profitability of a radio station depends directly on its audience size.  So radio 
stations choose their genre such that, given the distribution of other stations, no alternative 
genre is more profitable.  In genre g there are μgg enthusiast consumers each devoting time tg 
to listening to the radio and (1-μg)g faddists devoting time tgF to radio listening so that the 
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total listening time of fans in genre g is {μgtg+(1-μg)tgF}g.  Supposing that genre g attracts Kg 
stations, the profit of each is: 
    (
  
  
)  
   
  
{     (    )   }       
    
  
      (5) 
where the second equality follows in equilibrium, wherein tg=tgf.  
Rolling back to the decisions of the record companies, they take the number of radio 
stations in their genre as given.  All recordings sell for a price p and the record company 
retains all such earnings for new bands, by virtue of its contract with each band.  Expected 
recording sales revenue from a typical new band in genre g is: 
              (6) 
where xgj is given in (2).   
On top of new band record sales revenues, record companies also receive record sales 
and a genre-specific rent of φRg from a successful band in genre g for one period – where φ, 
discussed below, is less than one – and this is all discounted by the common discount factor 
δ.  In steady state, new entrant band numbers and successful band numbers (in expectation) 
are constant so the record company's maximand is: 
      [  ∑    
   
   
 (    )∑     
   
   
]                     (7) 
Finally, we turn to the entry decisions of bands.  The essential choice for them is 
whether or not to enter (i.e. to form a band that seeks a record contract.)  In genre g there are 
Mg bands vying for recording contracts, which are granted only to ng1≤Mg of the bands.  All 
bands are ex ante identical so a band's probability of an initial contract is simply ng1/Mg.  If 
f(ng1) new entrants succeed (discussed more fully below) then the probability of success, 
conditional on being contracted, is f(ng1)/ng1.  With the probability of surviving from period 2 
to period 3 being h, the overall ex ante probability of an entrant making it to period 3 (and so 
going off-contract) is then (ng1/Mg)(f(ng1)/ng1)h or (f(ng1)/Mg)h.  An entrant incurs a fixed cost 
Faddists and enthusiasts 
-13- 
of FB initially and, if it turns out to be unsuccessful, it will then receive zero (its losses being 
borne by the record company), so its decision is driven solely by its payoff in the case of 
success.  If a band enters it anticipates that it will, if it survives to period 3, receive φRg plus 
record sales revenues (of (pλg(1-μg))xg2j) in that period.  In equilibrium, then, a band will be 
indifferent about entry only if its expected return is zero.  Denoting by G* the set of genres 
profitable for radio stations, our equilibrium condition is: 
 
 (   )
  
 (   (    ) (   )     ) 
          
  
(8) 
We now say a little more about the per-band rent in a genre, Rg.  We assume that this 
is an increasing function of the faddist consumer demand for that genre, g(1-μg), and a 
decreasing function of the number of successful bands in that genre, Ngs=ng2+ng3+ng*.  To be 
specific, we suppose that the aggregate rent in g is a linear function of consumer numbers, 
cgg(1-μg) for some constant cg, and that the per-band rent is then simply their record-sales 
weighted share of this.  So we assume, using xgs to denote the expected record sales of a 
successful domestic band, that  
         (    )        
  
(9) 
But this rent is a transfer from faddist consumers buying T-shirts, for example, or attending 
concerts, and represents the aggregate value placed by such consumers on these services.  It 
costs the bands real resources to provide these services and we suppose simply that this cost 
is some fraction of the consumer valuation.  Consequently, if consumers pay Rg for services 
they value at that price, only a fraction φ [0,1] accrues to bands as rent.  Then equilibrium 
condition (8) becomes: 
  
 (   )
  
   (    ) (   )(     ) 
          
  
(10) 
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ii. Welfare 
Free entry by bands and radio stations ensures zero expected profits for them,
15
 leaving 
record company profit and consumer surplus as the components of national welfare.  For 
record companies we have profit as described in (7) in any period. 
 Following Anderson and de Palma (1992), consumer surplus in genre g is: 
           (∑   (      )
   
   
)       (   )   (∑   (  )
   
   
) 
(11) 
for enthusiast consumers and, for faddists for all successful bands
16
: 
      (    )  ( 
   )   (∑    (  )
   
   )   (12) 
with   [    (  
 
   
   
)  (    ) ] and T
f
 defined isomorphically.  So aggregate 
consumer surplus in genre g can be written: 
               
  [  (   )   (∑    (  )
   
   )  (    )( 
   )   (∑    (  )
   
   )]  
(13) 
In sum, in any period in steady state we have welfare generated by genre g, Wg, as: 
     [   ∑    
   
    (    )(     )∑     
   
   ]              
  [  (   )   (∑    (  )
   
   )  (    )( 
   )   (∑    (  )
   
   )]  
(14) 
 
Note that if each successful band gets the same airtime, a, then CSgf simplifies down to (1-
μg)λg(T
f
-p)[ln(Ngs)+a]. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
  As noted previously, we do not model the advertising side of the radio stations’ problem explicitly.  But, in 
terms of welfare, we assume that the advertising market is competitive and that advertisers extract no surplus 
from advertising. 
16
 Note that the rent transfer does not enter into consumer welfare as it represents the valuation consumers place 
on the non-recording services received from successful bands and so washes out.  
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iii. The nature of band ‘success’ 
We have assumed that, at the end of a period, only some fraction of new entrants in genre g 
will survive.  The Appendix discusses a number of alternative ways in which this success 
might be modeled.  For the remainder of the paper we take the case in which success is 
entirely exogenous: the number of successful bands is a known, deterministic function of the 
number of new entrants: 
      (   )  ( )     
  (   )       
(15) 
As only a fraction h of period 2 successful bands go on to be successful bands off-contract in 
period 3, we have ng3=hng2=hf(ng1) so that the total number of successful bands in genre g in 
any period is given in steady state by Ngs=(1+h)f(ng1)+ng
*
.   
In period one the record company in genre g signs up ng1 bands.  But, because all new 
bands in a genre sign with the same record company, so all revenues from new band sales 
accrue to the same company.  As record sales are expressed in terms of market shares, so the 
record company’s share of new band sales is always one.  Of course, ng2=f(ng1) of these bands 
then succeed and go onto period two, and this is where the choice of ng1 impacts potential 
record company profits.  With ng2 deterministic, so too is per-band airtime and the record 
company’s profit is:  
         (      )              (16) 
where          and    (    )(     )   are positive constants.  That is, denoting 
by ags the airtime devoted to a successful band in genre g,  
  (   )        (   )
   (   )
(   ) (   )   (   )        (   )
      
  (   )   
(17) 
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iv. Equilibrium 
Solving a radio station’s problem yields: 
              (18) 
Deviations from this ratio will reduce consumer welfare and therefore reduce their listening 
time devoted to the radio.   
 As tg=tgF in equilibrium so expressions (4) and (18) imply that tg=β
β
(1-β)1-β/w so total 
listening time is ββ(1-β)1-βg/w, earning the station total advertising revenues of αβ
β
(1-β)1-
βg/w.  Thus (5) becomes: 
    (
  
  
)   
  
  
      
 
 
  
  
(  (   )   )        (19) 
We ignore the integer constraint on the number of radio stations and treat it as a continuous 
variable.  Consequently our free entry condition for radio stations becomes, denoting by G* 
the set of weakly profitable genres, 
 
  
  
           
  
  
   
 
 
  
  
(  (   )   )        
(20) 
From this, note that the more popular the genre, ceteris paribus, the larger will be the number 
of radio stations operating in that genre: Kg is increasing in λg. 
The problem facing a record company in genre g is, 
    
{   }
  (   )       
 (   )
{(   ) (   )     }
        (   )   (21) 
This yields a FOC and SOC as follows: 
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(22) 
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 The Appendix demonstrates that the solution to the record company’s problem yields 
an optimal choice of ng1 where the signs of partial derivatives are as shown: 
        (         ⏟  
( )
            ⏟
( )
   
 
⏟
(   )
) 
(23) 
For bands, with no quota E(xgs)=1/Ngs so (10) solves for Mg as follows: 
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       (                ⏟
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⏟
( )
) 
(24) 
 In many models of entry behind a fixed cost we observe that the laissez-faire solution 
leads to over-entry from a social perspective due to the well-known business-stealing effect.  
In this model, however, the ‘entry’ decision for new bands (in terms of being contracted etc.) 
is made by a record company for all the potential entrants.  Any business stealing by a new 
band is pure cannibalization and so it will be taken into account when entry is determined.  
For this reason, there is no presumption in this model that there will be over-entry.   
 On the contrary, we can see that the laissez-faire solution in this model involves too 
few new domestic (and, consequently, subsequently successful domestic) bands.  The record 
company chooses ng1 to maximize its own profits but welfare is the sum of profits and the 
consumer surplus of both faddist and enthusiast consumers.  From (11) and (12):  
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(25) 
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So, unsurprisingly, consumer surplus for all consumers is increasing in ng1 and the 
implication is that the laissez-faire solution involves too few bands from a social welfare 
perspective, as the record company ignores the impact on CS of its contracting decisions.  An 
optimal intervention to correct this would be one that directly targets ng1; that is, a subsidy to 
F1, the fixed cost of contracting new bands.   
 We summarize these results in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The laissez-faire equilibrium of this model involves 
i. The radio broadcasting of new and established music in the proportion 
β/(1-β) in every genre; 
ii. Entry of radio stations into a genre in direct proportion to λg, the 
popularity of the genre in the listening public; 
iii. The choice by a record company in a genre of the number of new bands to 
sign to contracts, where this number is increasing in the price of 
recordings, the popularity of the genre in the population, and the rents that 
accrue to bands in the genre; is decreasing in the proportion of the genre’s 
consumers that are enthusiasts, the survival rate of successful bands and 
the record company’s fixed cost of contracting bands, and is non-
monotonic in the number of foreign bands in the genre; 
iv. The entry into the genre of a number of bands seeking contracts where that 
number is increasing in the price of recordings, the popularity of the genre 
in the population, the rents that accrue to bands in the genre, the number of 
new bands signed up by the record company, the band’s discount factor 
and the survival rate of successful bands; and is decreasing in the 
proportion of the genre’s consumers that are enthusiasts, the number of 
foreign bands in the genre and the fixed cost of entry by bands; 
v. Too few contracted bands from an aggregate welfare perspective. 
 
5. A local content quota 
A simple
17
 local content requirement imposed on a genre g will require stations in that genre 
to play domestic music in a certain proportion – equivalently, airtime devoted to foreign 
music must be less than some proportion of total airtime.   Thus the quota is a constraint that 
∑    
   
  
 
    for some airtime level Q.   
                                                 
17
  By which we mean a quota that draws no distinction between new and established domestic artists.   
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 As is shown more formally in the Appendix, a just-binding simple quota on foreign 
bands' airtime will, in the short run
18
, lead to an increase in the airtime devoted to successful 
domestic bands, with no consequences for the aggregate airtime split between new and 
established bands.  As a consequence, nothing disturbs the free-entry condition governing 
radio stations in each genre.  However, the increased airtime for successful domestic bands 
means higher expected record sales for such bands and thus higher expected profits for new 
bands in the affected genre.  This induces immediate entry by new bands into that genre. In 
the medium run this entry of new bands will lead to an increased number of successful 
domestic bands in the genre who are on contract to record companies and, in the long run, 
this will flow through to the number of successful domestic bands off contract. 
 Turning to welfare, there is clearly a profit-increasing effect of a tighter quota.  This 
occurs for standard profit-shifting reasons: given the fixed recording price, the quota shifts 
airtime to successful domestic bands and so increases domestic record sales and profits 
therefrom.  As noted, there is no distortion of the optimal airtime mix but both ng1 and Ngs are 
increased by the quota.   
 Our expression for consumer surplus is now, noting that T=T
f
 in equilibrium and that 
each new band gets the same airtime 1/ng1,  
      (   ) [  (  (   )  
 
   
)  (    )   (  
    (
 
  
 )  (  
 ) (   )   (
     
(   ) (   )
))]   
(26) 
Consequently there are conflicting effects on consumers of a tightening of the quota.  
Enthusiast consumers are strictly better off: the quota induces entry of new bands and 
enthusiasts’ welfare is increasing in the number of bands, ng1, an effect that more than offsets 
their losses from lower airtime per band.  These bands are signed up because the profitability 
                                                 
18
  Immediately the policy is imposed and before ‘successful’ band numbers can respond.  That is, in the first 
period following the policy’s imposition. 
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of successful bands has increased.  In many contexts, this kind of entry – induced at an earlier 
stage by the prospect of subsequent profits – will simply dissipate any subsequent rents and 
so is welfare-neutral, at best.  But in this model enthusiast consumers benefit from an 
increased diversity of new bands, whether they subsequently succeed or not.  For some 
faddist consumers, however, there is a welfare loss from the reduced airtime for foreign 
bands: consumers who purchase the recordings of foreign bands now get lower gains from 
such purchases.  But that reduced airtime is now devoted to successful domestic bands, the 
number of which has increased and this benefits faddist consumers.  The Appendix 
demonstrates that any simple quota that induces entry must raise the consumer surplus of 
faddist consumers overall; this is certainly the case for a mild (i.e. just-binding) quota.   
 Turning to other players, the quota has no effects on radio stations’ entry decisions.  
But for bands a quota gives an incentive for entry into a constrained genre due to both the 
increase in expected third-period record sales – the proceeds of which accrue to the band – 
and the increase in the number of bands signed in the genre.  So there is an increase in the 
number of bands in the genre seeking contracts.   
 Now suppose that the economy as a whole is characterized by a variety of genres 
differing by foreign band concentration.  Suppose that a common quota is imposed across all 
genres.
 19
  The relative impact on one genre versus another will depend ultimately on the 
relative impact of the quota on expected record sales for successful bands across genres – 
while it is the third-period manifestation of this that is of interests to bands in their entry 
decisions, it is the second-period occurrence that induces record companies to sign up more 
new entrant bands.  A given quota will be more profitable in terms of raising domestic record 
sales the more binding it is on foreign acts i.e. the greater is the proportion of airtime devoted 
                                                 
19
  Australia, however, has genre-specific quotas, with higher local content requirements in more popular genres.  
There are five categories of music and local content requirements range from 25% in the contemporary popular 
music format (and at least 25% of the local content must be “new”: released in the previous 12 months) to 5% in 
niche formats, such as jazz, with no “new” constraint. 
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to foreign bands in the absence of a quota.  Hence we see our “Canadian divas” effect: a 
sector-wide common quota induces greater entry of domestic bands seeking contracts in 
genres where foreign music is more concentrated. 
 We summarize these results in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: A simple local content quota in steady state in this model, 
i. Will leave the radio airplay mix between new and established bands unaffected 
but will increase the share of airplay devoted to successful domestic bands; 
ii. Will leave entry decisions by radio stations unaffected; 
iii. Will increase both entry and contracting of domestic bands and thus the 
number of both new and successful domestic bands; 
iv. Will lead to greater ‘internationalization’ of domestic music: a greater share 
of domestic music (both played by entrants and contracted bands and heard on 
the radio) is produced by bands in genres where international music is most 
prevalent; 
v. Is welfare-improving if the quota is mild: just binding. 
 
i. A new-music quota 
As noted in the Introduction, a number of countries have introduced rather more complicated 
quotas that require not only that domestic music receive a greater share of radio airtime but 
that some proportion of this be allocated to ‘new’ domestic music.  This is to prevent exactly 
the behavior just described: that a radio station meets the quota simply by playing more 
established domestic artists, rather than airing new ones.  Such a quota has two components: 
a ‘simple’ quota as analyzed above combined with a requirement that more new music be 
played.
20
  In this sub-section we focus on the second of these two effects and, as all new 
entrant music in our model is generated by domestic bands, we consider a policy that requires 
an increase in Ag/Ags.   
 If a policy is imposed that requires an increase in Ag at the expense of Ags then this 
will reduce the overall time devoted to listening to the radio, by (4).  Ignoring this change in 
tg for the moment, for given band numbers, the increase in Ag has no effect on record 
                                                 
20
  In fact, the requirement can be met by playing new releases from established bands.  Our model does not 
permit this possibility: implicitly bands here issue a single recording at the start of their lives and sell it for, 
potentially, three periods.   
Faddists and enthusiasts 
-22- 
company profits: the increase in airtime each band receives has no impact on their record 
sales as it is common to all bands in the genre and overall record sales are unchanged (at 
μgλg.)  The decrease in Ags will be shared across all successful bands, foreign and domestic, so 
every successful band will get reduced airtime.  But the overall domestic share of record sales 
and rents will be unaffected by this and, again, total record sales are unaffected so the 
domestic record company is not impacted by this policy at all.  Hence it signs no additional 
bands and there are no entry/exit consequences of the policy. 
 But welfare is impacted through the distortion induced in the radio airtime mix and 
the consequent reduction in airtime devoted to radio listening by consumers
21
.  This distortion 
reduces the overall time devoted to listening to the radio so consumer surplus for all 
consumers falls.  For a just-binding quota this effect is second-order, of course, but the 
reduction in listening time is reflected in exit by radio stations.  If the quota affects some 
genres more than others then we will observe in this case an increase in the relative amount 
of domestic music broadcast: all stations broadcast more domestic content and exiting 
stations are those in genres where the quota binds most tightly i.e. those with a greater 
concentration of foreign artists.   
 Now, this quota involves the packaging of the policy just described with a simple 
quota, analyzed previously.  Consequently, this quota when just-binding will be welfare-
improving under the same circumstances and for the same reasons that a just-binding simple 
quota is welfare-improving.  However, a non-marginal new-music quota will yield lower 
overall welfare than the equivalent simple quota. 
 We summarize these results in the following proposition: 
                                                 
21
  In a richer model of advertising, this reduction in tg would also impact on the advertising market.  In this 
model we will see a decrease in the number of radio stations in genre g following the quota, as tg falls in (19).  
This is a feature of our model: consumers have no preferences across radio stations in a particular genre, as they 
are all identical, so when less time is devoted to listening to a genre it is reflected not in the listening time per 
station but in the total number of stations.  This exit of stations has no welfare consequences of its own, due to 
the zero profit condition for station equilibrium.   
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Proposition 3: In this model, a new-music quota in steady state will, beyond the effects 
of the simple quota,  
i. Alter the radio airplay mix in favor of new (domestic) bands; 
ii. Lead to lower airtime for every successful band, domestic or foreign, and 
increased airtime per new domestic band, both for each remaining radio 
station and in aggregate; 
iii. Have no consequences for record sales; 
iv. Lead to the exit of some radio stations; 
v. Have no consequences for entry or the contracting of new domestic bands and 
thus for the number of both new and successful domestic bands; 
vi. Lead to greater ‘internationalization’ of domestic music to the extent that it 
drives out radio stations in the most heavily affected genres: those that are 
most ‘international’; 
vii. Reduce welfare at a greater rate than a simple quota when it becomes 
increasingly binding. 
 
6. Modeling choices and robustness 
i.  Multiple record companies in each genre.   
The assumption that each genre is characterized by a single record company buys us a great 
deal in terms of the tractability of the analysis by reducing the company’s choice of the 
number of new entrants to sign down to a decision that depends only on later period profits 
and not those in the first period.  With competition amongst record companies in a genre the 
optimal choice of ng1 would also consider its impact on business-stealing from other 
competing record companies (see Appendix.)  This is likely to lead to greater numbers of 
bands throughout the market and so to lessen, or even completely offset, the under-entry 
problem discussed.  Consequently, the welfare consequences of local content requirements 
are likely to be more negative than in our analysis.   
 
ii.  Faddists and enthusiasts.   
An alternative to our faddist/enthusiast distinction would be simply to posit a single type of 
consumer who draws their favorite band from the entire set of alternatives.  Under the 
discrete choice model of record buying used here, the probability of a consumer buying the 
recording of band j in genre g would become: 
Faddists and enthusiasts 
-24- 
     
   {   }
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    ∑    {   }
   
   
 
(27) 
Such a change would make little or no difference to the qualitative results of our analysis, but 
would complicate the algebra significantly.  Under our current separation, if all bands of one 
type receive the same airplay (e.g. absent any quota) then each has an equal market share.  
With this more general specification that is still the case, but the denominator of these market 
share expressions for each type of band depends on the airtimes of all the bands in the genre, 
domestic or foreign, new or successful.  So an increase in the airtime devoted to successful 
domestic bands (the novel component of the new-music quota discussed above) will now 
directly impact the record sales of new domestic bands, independent of any effect on entry. 
 
iii.  Technological change   
Our model is motivated by an industry structure that has prevailed for some decades in the 
commercial music business.  With high fixed costs of recording and promoting artists, record 
companies fill an essential role of funding start-ups (new entrants), radio plays an essential 
role in bringing new recordings to consumers’ attention and successful bands and record 
companies share, in some fashion, in both the proceeds from record sales and any other rents 
that might be generated by successful bands.  In recent years, many things have changed in 
the way that music is commercialized and here we reflect briefly on how these changes might 
impact on our model.  See Richardson and Wilkie (2013) for a more complete discussion.  
Our conclusion is that the quota analysis is robust to these changes wrought, particularly, by 
the internet. 
 Recent years have seen at least four significant and related developments in the music 
industry.  First is a substantial reduction in the costs of recording and disseminating music.  
Second is the growth of electronic music downloading, both legal and otherwise.  Third is a 
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dramatic decrease in the importance of recording sales revenues for bands, compared to 
concert and related revenues.  Fourth is the rise of internet radio and the role of internet 
services in the dissemination of new music. 
 The development of cheap software and hardware has made it easier for artists to run 
home studios and the use of social media is often perceived as reducing the costs of 
disseminating music.  Simply reducing the fixed cost of recording and promotion, so long as 
artists cannot sidestep the record companies completely, has straightforward effects in our 
model, through the comparative statics of a change in F, and does nothing to affect the 
qualitative analysis of a quota. Note, too, that the empirical incidence of artists bypassing the 
record company model successfully is vanishingly small: because of the marketing services a 
record company provides, the vast majority of commercially successful artists still transact 
with record companies along the lines modeled here.
22
   
 The existence of new online distribution structures also has little impact on our 
qualitative analysis of the effects of a quota: it does not matter if distribution is through 
buying physical CDs at a shop (either online or not) or downloading an MP3.
23
  The 
explosion of illegal downloading could be significant insofar as it undermines the record 
company business model, but the structure of record companies has not much changed in the 
internet era and our analysis seems to apply equally to the current situation.
24
 
                                                 
22
 See Table 1 at p.671 of Connolly and Krueger (2006), which identifies the top earning 35 artists who toured 
the U.S. in 2002.  All of these are affiliated with recording companies and most with the then major labels 
(Sony, Warner, BMG, EMI and Universal, or subsidiaries thereof.)   More recently, Businesswire.com (2012) 
reports that in Nielsen Soundscan’s 2011 Music Industry Report the four large record companies – Sony and 
BMG merged in 2004 – had a combined market share of 90% of sales of physical album sales in 2011, 86% of 
sales of digital albums and 87% of sales of digital tracks.  The residual shares are likely to be dominated by 
smaller record companies.   
23
  Cowen (2008) notes that, in 2008, the most significant retailer of music in the U.S. was still Wal-Mart, 
although Apple’s iTunes was second. 
24
  Record companies have experienced declining revenues from the increase in downloading in recent years and 
we have seen a concomitant increase in so-called “360 degree” contracts, in which record companies take shares 
of profit from non-record sale related activities of their artists.  This is essentially built in to our analysis already, 
as we assume that all revenues generated by a band on contract, whether from record sales or not, accrue to its 
record company at first.   
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Connolly and Krueger (2006) provide a thorough description of the economics of 
popular music and one of their main observations is that, for most modern artists, non-
recording related income is much more significant than income derived from the sales of 
recorded music.
25
  This has little impact on our analysis; it is an observation regarding the 
relative size of recording revenues and what we model as rents, a ratio that does not affect our 
results, so long as they are complementary
26
 in the sense that record sales are a necessary 
prerequisite to success as a touring artist.   
In the abstract, the rise of internet radio means little for our analysis: whether a 
recording is heard on AM/FM radio, a digital radio or streamed over the internet, so long as it 
feeds into the likely success of an artist then our analysis still applies.
27
  More significantly, 
though, internet radio threatens the very feasibility of the policy instrument we have analyzed 
here: the local content quota.  The technology of radio broadcasts means that, for most 
national regulators, controlling the broadcasts of all stations within one’s sovereign territory 
means controlling the lion’s share of radio broadcasts heard by denizens of that country.28  
But, for example, the ability of a Canadian regulator to control the content of a Californian 
internet radio station is effectively zero, unless the station is simply blocked completely.  The 
                                                 
25
 They note that in 2003 recording sales in the US earned $11.8 billion versus $2.1 billion for concert ticket 
sales. They quote one band manager as saying that the top 10 per cent of artists make money selling records, but 
the rest go on tour (p.673.) 
26
 See Connolly and Krueger (2006) p.687.  Note, too, that the U.S. Billboard pop charts that document the 
“top” recordings of the week are constructed to reflect explicitly both the highest selling albums of the week and 
which tracks from those albums are aired most regularly on radio broadcasting. 
27
  There is some evidence that radio airplay was, relatively recently, still a significant factor in the music 
purchasing decisions of consumers.  French Music Bureau (2003) at p.67 notes that the two most significant 
factors influencing the decision to buy a new album in the U.K. in 2002 were “hearing tracks from it on the 
radio” and “already know hit from hit single”.   
28
  This clearly varies from country to country.  It is far easier for Australia, for instance, to regulate what its 
citizens hear on the radio than for France, although language barriers reduce the temptation of French consumers 
to listen to, for example, German radio broadcasts.  But outside of land-based radio broadcasts, it is unclear 
what a regulator can do.  In Australia, Vizard (1999) expresses this pithily: “Do we have jurisdiction over off-
shore suppliers who beam in by Internet, phone and satellite? How do we force the Los Angeles news Internet 
provider to include content relevant to us? How do we mandate that the BBC international news service include 
Australian weather reports? Or that the Discovery Channel include a pack of Tasmanian Devils savaging a 
sparrow?” 
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rise of new media for the circulation of music is, in our judgment, the most serious threat to 
the use of local content requirements in broadcasting, from a regulator’s perspective.  
Finally, our analysis supposes that consumers hear new music only through their radio 
listening (which is why radio airtime is critical for bands’ success) and we have cited survey 
data that supports the importance of radio listening in this fashion (see fn. 27.)  The 
development of internet radio services such as Pandora (www.pandora.com) changes this 
nexus, as they provide individualized playlists based on a consumer’s  listening patterns.  
Nevertheless, so long as consumers continue to have preferences over music listening as we 
have modeled here, a commercial provider still has the same incentive as radio stations in our 
model to provide playlists in that same ratio.
29
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has presented a model of the recorded music industry, integrating the demand and 
supply sides through the modeling of consumers, radio stations, record companies and artists.  
The model has then been used to analyze the supply-side consequences of local music quotas 
imposed on broadcasters. 
 We show that a mild (just binding) quota will be welfare-improving in this model, as 
it induces a domestic record company to sign up more new bands and this is welfare-
improving for consumers who gain from diversity.  Nevertheless, the quota will induce an 
‘internationalization’ of domestic music – what we dub the ‘Canadian divas effect’ – by 
inducing domestic entry primarily into genres most dominated by international artists.  If the 
quota also requires that some increased proportion of new domestic music be played, we 
identify an additional welfare loss due to the distorted programming choices it induces from 
affected radio stations.   
                                                 
29
  The main way in which services such as Pandora.com change the music market is in catering to preference 
heterogeneity across individual consumers.  Our model has no heterogeneity within a genre. 
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While the Appendix does discuss this matter, for tractability in this model we finesse 
the potentially significant issue of band quality: all bands here have the same probability of 
success (for a given amount of radio airtime.)  So one possible negative welfare effect of a 
quota – quality downgrading as record companies sign up lower-quality bands in response to 
the quota on foreign music – is not a feature here.   
 We consider the central contributions of the paper to be, first, its more thorough 
analysis of the supply-side effects of (i.e. the responses of artists and record companies to) 
local content quotas in broadcasting than has been undertaken previously and, second, its 
development of an integrated model of this sector.  We identify a new channel by which such 
a quota might raise welfare but also illustrate its possibly perverse effects on the diversity of 
domestic music.  
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APPENDIX 
i. Radio broadcasting quotas in practice1 
In many countries, local content requirements in radio broadcasting are nearly as old as radio 
broadcasting itself.  For example, the first Canadian radio station to broadcast regular 
programming – XWA/Montreal – went to air in 1919; in 1932 the Canadian Radio Broadcasting 
Commission (CRBC) was established to regulate and control all broadcasting in Canada and 
provide a national broadcasting service, determining the number, location and power of radio 
stations as well as the time that should be devoted to national and local programming.   
The extent of local content requirement varies considerably – from 20% in New Zealand 
(since 2002), for example, through 35% in Canada to 80% in Nigeria
2
 – and the definition of 
local content also varies.  The Canadian MAPL system
3
 is perhaps the most explicit and 
generally requires that Canadian content satisfy two of the following requirements: M (music) – 
the music is composed entirely by a Canadian; A (artist) – the music is, or the lyrics are, 
performed principally by a Canadian; P (production) – the musical selection consists of a live 
performance that is (i) recorded wholly in Canada, or (ii) performed wholly in Canada and 
broadcast live in Canada; L (lyrics) – the lyrics are written entirely by a Canadian.   (By this 
reasoning, much of the music of Krugman’s “Canadian divas” does not qualify as Canadian 
content.)   
In Australia, by contrast, the requirement is simply that broadcasting, “consists of music 
performed by Australians” and, “where more than one performer is involved in a musical 
                                                 
1
  For a more comprehensive discussion of broadcasting content protection around the world in 2000, see Appendix 
F of Productivity Commission (2000). 
2
  See Letts (2003) at p.3. 
3
  See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (2009).  
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performance, the musical items concerned shall be regarded as being performed by an Australian if 
the performance is predominantly by one or more Australians” where this appears to refer to 
Australian residents (Commercial Radio Australia (2011) §4.)4   
 A prominent set of local cultural content requirements is that of France.  Originally 
implemented in 19965 and reformed in 2000, it now requires radio stations (subject to some 
variations across formats) to broadcast a minimum of 40% music performed in French (or a regional 
language spoken in France) at least half of which must be devoted to new French artists.     
 
  
                                                 
4
  Following a High Court of Australia decision (High Court of Australia (1998)) with respect to content rules in TV 
broadcasting, it is likely that NZ artists can also be included in the Australian radio content quota under the auspices 
of the CER free trade agreement between the two countries.   
5
  This is not inconsistent with the European single-market philosophy, which also specifies European-wide content.  
In 1989 the European Union implemented the ironically-named Television Without Frontiers directive protecting 
audio-visual content within Europe and noting that, “all broadcasts emanating from and intended for reception 
within the Community … should respect the law of the originating Member State applicable to broadcasts intended 
for reception by the public in that Member State.”  See The Council of the European Communities (1989).     
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ii. The nature of band ‘success’ 
In the paper we assume that the number of successful bands is a known, deterministic function of 
the number of new entrants: 
      (   )  ( )     
  (   )       
 
As only a fraction h of period 2 successful bands go on to be successful bands off-contract in 
period 3, we have ng3=hng2=hf(ng1) so that the total number of successful bands in genre g in any 
period is given in steady state by Ngs=(1+h)f(ng1)+ng
*
.  This approach is one in which the 
probability of success is entirely exogenous. 
 But, while there is doubtless some uncertainty in the future prospects of a band, the 
essence of ‘success’ is that a record company decides to retain a particular band on contract.  
Consequently, ‘success’ is endogenous and is essentially a decision made by the record 
company.   So suppose that the record company can choose ng1, as we have assumed so far, but 
can then also choose ng2, almost independently.  With everything as before, this means that the 
record company’s problem becomes:  
    
{      }
        
   
{(   )       }
                          
(A1) 
It is clear from this that, as noted earlier, the record company would never choose any ng1 in 
excess of one if it were looking only to its profits from new bands.  The only thing that motivates 
a higher value is that it relaxes the constraint on ng2.  It can be easily seen from this problem that 
the record company would never choose a value of ng1 strictly in excess of its desired value of 
ng2 – i.e. the constraint will always bind – so, letting ng1= ng1≡n for notational simplicity, its 
steady-state problem is simply:  
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{ }
        
 
{(   )     }
  (     ) (A2) 
 
This yields a FOC of : 
 
{ }  (   ) 
{(   )     }
  
  
 
{(   )     }
  
(     )
  
   
(A3) 
This is very similar to (16) in the paper and, indeed, the LHS of the FOC in (A3) is, as was (16), 
increasing in k2 and decreasing in F1, F2 and h.  Similarly, the derivative of (A3) wrt ng
*
 again 
has the same sign as (Ngs-2ng
*
).  So all the results derived in the deterministic case already 
analyzed apply in the same fashion to this equally deterministic case. 
 A more interesting and realistic case is that where record companies might draw some 
inference on a band’s innate ‘quality’ by observing their first period record sales and might then 
base its re-signing decision on this.  So suppose that bands have some innate ‘quality’ (say θ, 
drawn from some distribution on support [0,1]) unobservable to record companies but which 
affects their record sales.  In particular, suppose that a consumer again places a value vgj on 
purchasing the recording of a band j in genre g but that this value now depends not only on the 
band's share of radio airtime, agj, the price of the recording p, and the random idiosyncratic 
component εgj, but also on the band’s θ in the following manner: vgj= θgjagj + εgj – p.  A band of 
quality θ now has an expected market share of:  
     
   {      }
∑    {      }
 
   
 
(A4) 
where the denominator is summed to n=ng1 in the case of new bands and n=Ngs in the case of 
successful bands.  So now it is not the case that equal airtimes will lead to equal market shares.  
But, while record companies, ex hypothesi, cannot observe each θj directly, they can observe a 
contracted band’s actual record sales in its first period and so draw an inference as to its θ.  The 
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problem facing the record company is essentially that laid out in (21) except with this 
exponential ratio determining record sales: 
   
{      }
         (
   {      }
∑    {      }
   
   
)                
            
(A5) 
Now, even in the case where θ is distributed uniformly on [0,1], this problem is largely 
intractable due to the Poisson binomial distribution of the term in expectations.  So consider a 
more degenerate distribution: suppose that θ takes one of two values, θH or θL for θH>θL, where 
the probability of θH≡ρ and this is common knowledge.  The interesting case here is where θL is 
sufficiently low that the record company would not wish to retain a band known to be of that 
type: if this were not true then the realization of θ is of no interest to the record company and it 
would wish to retain all initially signed bands: the problem collapses to that just analyzed in 
which ng2=ng1.  Similarly, the problem is uninteresting if θH is so low that all successful bands 
fail to cover the record company’s fixed costs.  So we suppose that the distribution is such that a 
record company would wish to retain any band it knew to be of type θH and not re-sign any band 
it knew to be of type θL.  To be specific, we let θL=0 and θH=1. 
 Considering the program in (A5), we see again that the only consideration that would 
lead a record company to sign up more than one new band is its effect in relaxing the constraint 
on the number of successful bands and that, again, the record company would never wish to 
choose ng1 greater than its anticipated choice of ng2.  So, in steady state, its problem comes down 
to choosing ng1 when the expected number of bands that will be retained after period 1 is just 
ng2=ρng1 and given that all retained bands will have θ=1. Thus, if all airtimes are equal then each 
successful band has the same market share and the record company’s problem becomes: 
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{   }
        (
    
{(   )        }
)     (      )  (A6) 
This is directly isomorphic to the program in (21) and yields the same qualitative results. 
 In sum, we argue that the specification of ‘success’ in our earlier analysis can be altered 
quite significantly without changing the essential tenor of the results.    
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iii. Laissez-faire comparative statics 
By the SOC for ng1 in (22), the sign of dng1/dx is the same as that of d
2
E(πg)/dng1dx for any 
parameter x. The LHS of the FOC is increasing in k2 and is decreasing in F1, F2 and h, so the 
optimal number of new bands in a genre is decreasing in F1, F2 and h and increasing in all 
elements of k2 (i.e. increasing in p, L, φcg, λg and (1-μg)).  The derivative of the FOC wrt ng
*
 has 
the same sign as (Ngs-2ng
*
).  That is, the optimal number of domestic new bands in a genre is 
increasing in the number of foreign successful bands in the genre if and only if foreign bands 
constitute less than half of the total of successful bands in the genre in steady state.  
Alternatively, the optimal ng1 is increasing in ng
*
 if and only if the number of foreign bands is 
less than the number of successful domestic bands, both on and off contract.   
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iv. Analytics of a simple quota 
Suppose that the airtime devoted to foreign bands is restricted in genre g by a binding quota such 
that ∑    
   
  
 
    where Q is less than the laissez-faire choice by the radio station sans quota.  
We term this a ‘simple’ quota as it imposes no restrictions on the mix between new and 
successful domestic bands’ airtime.  The problem facing a radio station in this genre is 
unchanged and it will still choose Ag and Ags exactly as before, as given in (18).  But, given   
 , it 
must reduce the airtime per foreign band to meet the quota, to   
   
 
  
 , and this, for given ngs 
and ngsc, implies an increase in airtime per successful domestic band to 
   
  (     ) (        )⁄ . 
 From the analogue for successful bands of equation (2) we have, in the presence of a 
simple quota 
      
   {
     
   (   )
}
[   (   )   {
     
   (   )
}        (
 
   
)]
 (A7) 
 
For given ng1 (and therefore ng2) differentiating (A7) yields: 
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(A8) 
Thus a fall in Q (a tightening of the quota), leading to greater airtime for all successful domestic 
bands, leads to greater record sales.   
 The record company's steady state problem is, from (21) and (A7): 
 
   
{   }
 (  )        (   )               
      
 (   )   {
     
(   ) (   )
}
[(   ) (   )   { }        (
 
   
)]
        (   )   
(A9) 
The FOC for this problem is, dropping the argument of f for clarity: 
   ( 
 
    
(   )       )            (A10) 
where F≡F1+fʹF2>0.  But: 
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[ ] 
(    { }{ }     [ ]
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   { }  
[ ] 
( { }   [ ]  (   )   { }(  { }))
     ({ } 
     (   )   (  { })) 
(A11) 
where [.] and (.) represent the bracketed terms in (A9) and where we have also used the 
definition of xgs from that expression in simplifying.  Accordingly, the FOC for ng1 can be 
written as:  
 
      { } 
  (   )(   )
 
 (  { })        
 
  
    (  {
     
(   ) 
}) (   (   )    )  
 
  
   
(A12) 
Note that the expression in the curly bracket is a fraction less than one, so one minus that 
expression is positive.  Thus the term (fʹ-(1+h)fxgs) must also be positive.  Denoting the LHS of 
this equation by Γ, from the firm’s SOCs we know that the sign of dng1/dQ is the same as that of 
dΓ/dQ.  From (A7) we have  
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(A13) 
From (A12) the sign of dΓ/dQ is the same as that of  
 
 
  
(   (  {
     
(   ) 
}) (   (   )    ))
 (  (  { })( 
   (   )    )  
   ( 
  (   )    )
(   ) 
) 
(A14) 
Suppose this is evaluated at the no-quota solution.  At that point x=1/Ngs and 
(.)=(Ags/Ngs)=(Q/ng
*
).  So  
  |          
      { }   
[      { }](   ) 
  
   
(   ) 
   
Then the sign of dΓ/dQ is the same as that of 
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(A15) 
where the sign comes from the fact that (.)<1 and (f′-(1+h)fxgs)>0.   
 That is, a tightening of the quota – a fall in Q – evaluated at the no-quota solution will 
induce an increase in the number of new domestic bands.  Thus in steady state there is an 
increase in new entrants that flows through to the number of successful domestic bands, both on- 
and off-contract. 
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v. Welfare effects of simple quota 
From (A10), by the envelope theorem, 
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(A16) 
So a tightening of the quota (a fall in Q) raises the profits of the domestic record company.   
 For enthusiast consumers we have, from (25),  
           (   )   (      (
 
   
)) 
(A17) 
The only impact of a reduction in Q on such consumers is through the increase in ng that such a 
reduction induces.  But 
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(  
 
   
)    
(A18) 
For faddist consumers we have, symmetrically,  
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(A19) 
Thus: 
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(A20) 
where the square bracket in (A20) refers to the square bracketed term in (A19).  Differentiating 
the terms in CSgf  yields: 
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(A21) 
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This last expression is just exp(ag
*
)-exp(ags) and so is negative iff each domestic band gets more 
airtime, in equilibrium, than each foreign band.  Clearly these two are equal when the quota is 
just binding and, if ng1 were unchanged, then each domestic band would get strictly more airtime 
than each foreign band as the quota were tightened.  However, a fall in Q induces an increase in 
ng1, as discussed earlier, so the overall effect is not immediately obvious.  But the signing of new 
bands by the record company in response to a tighter quota only occurs because of the increased 
profitability of successful bands and that profitability is a monotonic increasing function of 
airtime for successful bands.  Hence it cannot be the case that entry is sufficient to reduce that 
airtime (and thus profitability.)  All in all, the solution cum quota must be such that per-band 
airtime for successful domestic bands must be no lower than in the absence of any quota.  Thus  
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(A22) 
and a sufficient condition for faddist consumers to gain from a quota (a reduction in Q) is that a 
tighter quota induces entry: dng1/dQ<0.  This is certainly satisfied when the quota is just binding, 
as demonstrated above.   
 All in all, then, a just-binding quota is welfare-improving, benefitting record companies 
and both faddist and enthusiast consumers. 
 Combining these effects,  
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vi. Multiple record companies in a genre 
Suppose that there are Ʀg record companies that operate in genre g.  The problem facing the 
typical record company, analogous to (21),  is: 
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(A24) 
where           and    (    )(     )    are the same positive constants as in the 
paper and k indexes the Ʀg record companies in the genre.  This yields a FOC as follows: 
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(A25) 
In the symmetric equilibrium, however, ng1i=ng1k ≡ng1 for all k, so ∑kng1k=Ʀg and ∑k≠ing1k=Ʀg-1 so 
this becomes: 
 
  (   )
     
 
(    )
(  )
 
   
     
  (   )[(   )(    ) (   )    
 ]
{(   )   (   )     }
 
 (    
 (   )  )    
(A26) 
Of course, this collapses to (22) when Ʀg=1.  But when there is more than one record company 
we pick up a new term in the FOC (A26) that is positive (albeit declining in ng1) and indicates 
that an increase in new band numbers for a record company provides a new source of additional 
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profits, compared to the single company case, due to the increased share of first-period profits 
that it generates.   
 The SOC for the firm is, from (A25) and suppressing the arguments of f(.):  
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(A27) 
 Differentiating (A26) with respect to Ʀg yields:  
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(A28) 
Clearly this is non-positive for Ʀg≥2, implying that each record company’s optimal choice of 
new bands to sign is decreasing in the number of record companies in the genre. 
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